178, 113 Southwest China AF16

[For trends in the adoption of lack of adoption of modern Western medical science in the local Chinese community, see 4: Hsu, Category 116, pp. 2-53.]

175 186 563 mutual suspicion and disdain. When many of the new factories and the modern, urbanized immigrants who largely ran them moved back to the more convenient locations and amenities of the eastern industrial centers after the war, their departure was mourned by few of the older population of Chungking. 178 Some of the factories remained in operation, however, and the wartime exploration of the mineral resources of the Southwestern provinces contributed not only new knowledge of the potential economic value of the Southwest but also impelling reasons for its further development and for tying it closer to the rest of China by improved communications.

177 The intellectual impact may have made a deeper, longer lasting impression on the people of the Southwest, simply because many of the students and older intellectuals were intensely desirous in their patriotic and socially idealistic zeal of establishing closer contacts with the masses of the people and contributing to their improved welfare and national consciousness. Likewise, most of the intellectuals in the rural education movement were devoted to improving the livelihood and educational level of the peasants. These rural teachers were fully conscious that if they attained their objective it would engender popular demands on the government for improved social conditions and more democratic, responsible political organization.

668 Both the organized rural education movement and the sporadic efforts of inspired students and professional people were handicapped by

166 the influence of more technically advanced easterners on the life of the local population. The first migration restocked the population in the Southwest Region; the second migration was less permanent, with the majority of the migrants returning to their native places upon the conclusion of World War II. However, not a few of these easterners have remained and made their homes in this region.

166 • 178 After 1949, the Communist program of industrialization concentrated upon the Northeast and Central South regions, but this does not mean that the Southwest Region is totally neglected. Many of the industrial establishments temporarily arranged to house the plants evacuated from the north and the east during the Sino-Japanese War have been retained and brought into the master plan for development of this region. Of 156 major industrial units involved in the Chinese Communists' first Five-Year Plan, over 19 per cent are located in this region.[15] The two steel plants in Chungking, the tin mining center in Yunnan Province, and the ordnance plant in Chengtu are undoubtedly attracting many workers and contributing to the rapid increase in population in such centers.

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15. Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955.

575 of people from East China into Southwest China during the war with Japan, the Ch'ing-pang organization was extended to the Southwest as well.

II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

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Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, so did the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite become contributing factors in the dislocation of the traditional social structure.

178 369 565 The traditional rural village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of whom owned land; the village gentry, that is to say, the local leaders, were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[10]

178 369 166 However, the growth of rural population without a comparable increase in arable land together with more opportunity for employment

10. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

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178 in the cities caused the migration of some peasants
369 to the urban centers. The continued high premium
166 placed on learning, practical or otherwise, induced the wealthier rural inhabitants to send their children to modern city schools which offered new opportunities. Thus, the cities became the centers from which the forces of change radiated into the surrounding countryside.

Some of the rural immigrants became permanent residents in the cities; others returned to their home villages. Among the permanent residents, some left their families in the country while others brought their immediate families (wives and children) to the cities. In either case, it meant the breaking up of family and clan relations. Industrial work and other city employment changed the outlook of these rural people; new professions such as modern medicine, law, engineering, and banking attracted the attention of those who would otherwise have been occupied
178 in the study of the Confucian Classics. This
871 was especially true after Confucian training had been found "impractical" and not in keeping with changing conditions. Education in the secondary schools and colleges, however inadequate and artificial it might seem, was designed for better citizenship.[11] Their curricula opened a new and different world, far more interesting

11. Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (the Haskell Lectures, University of Chicago, 1933) Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934. Teng and Fairbank, loc. cit.

178 and intelligible to the younger generation than the
871 classics of old. If modern education had not always succeeded in giving new skills to the student, it at least had taught him not to be resigned to his lot, but to look to the future rather
178 than to the past for betterment. With the in-
871 crease of schools, there emerged in the cities
565 a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years from their original environment. Students and intellectuals, seeking some common meeting ground, banded together; and with their newly established organizations came a semblance of separate class consciousness. Although frequently dependent for subsistence on their families, students had nothing to do with the cultivation or management
178 of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to
565 find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast with the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for positions in the ruling elite class, political power and economic power in modern China continued to be in the hands of a single group. When social nobility was made difficult by the lack of a clear and recognized channel for upward social movement, social rôles were less clearly defined; sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status

178 565 in the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

178 565 668 Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in the new schools, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders in China shows that the majority of them came from the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families, and had attended modern schools.[12] The labor unions, the peasants' associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new career.

178 70 874 555 565 During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaigns

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12. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-21.

against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their prestige to their military skill, suggest the reputation acquired by military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The Chinese Communists, like Communists elsewhere, claim adherence to orthodoz Marxist teachings. They analyze the existing social structure in China in terms of the theory of class struggle and insist on the inevitability of a classless society. In the name of evolving toward this state they justify the liquidation of certain segments of the Chinese population "which stand in the way of the regime." Doing so, they cause changes in the social structure of China.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the People. In the first group were included

596 were allotted each member according to his needs, as they were determined by the head of the house and permitted by the family's circumstances.

Some variation from this pattern occurred among the upper-class families. Gentry-officials and merchants were often away from home; they frequently had personal income from salaries or business, from which they met their expenses without resorting to the family treasury.

The family and its extensions in China also functioned to provide security in old age, food or material help to the poor, and employment for needy or desrving relatives when possible. That a son should not provide for his parents in their old age was unthinkable. Were the sons dead or in some other way unable to assist their parents, the aged were cared for by other close relatives or by the clan. Deeply sanctioned by kinship morality and firmly rooted in Chinese government and business, nepotism was one of the most resistant factors to the advance of the modern political, industrial, and business systems in the twentieth century.

III. THE CHANGING FAMILY

A. Influence of Modern Technology

596 178 The transition which occurred in the traditional Chinese family from approximately

596 1842 to the advent of the Communist regime is
178 traceable to three major influences: (1) modern technology with its attendant factory system and modern business organization; (2) the new environment consisting of rapid transportation, modern government education, rural education organizations, and modern books and periodicals; and (3) the revolutionary political and social ferment which followed in the wake of the Western penetration of China. Change came first and most penetratingly in the ports, which were initially influenced by Western trade and later by the growth of native industry centered on those cities. The same influences also reached into the rural environs of the city ports in the decades before World War II. The great mass of the Chinese people -- the population of the traditional villages, towns, and cities in the interior -- felt the modern impact only in minor ways, if at all.

The first influence of modern technology in China came in the form of an influx of manufactured goods. Their availability at cheap prices changed the consumption and production habits of the family. Articles formerly made at home were bought with cash, necessitating new types of spare-time or full-time occupation removed from the family sphere.

596 Much more important in effecting a change
491 in the old family pattern was the introduction of
198 modern factory and business methods into China.
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178 For one thing, it organized economic activity on
361 a non-family basis. Persons from rural areas
471 attracted to the city by the opportunity to earn
596 an independent income or the necessary supplement to the family's farm income were forced to make their homes near their jobs for at least a part of the year. Either permanently or temporarily they were removed from direct family control and subject to the new ideas associated with industrial society everywhere.

Another consequence of the factory and business system was a new criteria for employment. The efficiency operation of modern production and management required that personnel be hired on the basis of the possesion of such skills as a particular job demanded rather than on the old basis of personal or kin relationship to the owner or responsible management. The solidarity of blood relationship and the old employment function of kinship were prime resistants to the spread of modern business enterprise in China, but where the latter succeeded in establishing itself, it forced a fundamental break in the old Chinese familial process.

B. Influence of Modern Environment

871 In many places where the Chinese popula-
178 tion was sheltered from direct contact with
596 modern industrial life, an indirect influence was exerted by the environment. The modern curriculum taught in foreign missionary schools in the late nineteeth and twentieth centuries was approximated by the new government schools and

871 offered to a broader segment of the population in
178 the decade before World War II. New social,
596 political, and economic ideas thus disseminated were supplemented by the outpourings of the press.
489 Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or
596 more away from the nearest great city were
178 brought only hours away by modern methods of transportation, particularly the railroad and the steamship. All these media brought the people and especially the young into contact with ideas and way of life alien to their own. Awareness of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures to be had in the modern city planted a seed of dissatisfaction with the old manner of living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

668 An even more disturbing influence on the
178 old way of life was the increasing spread of revo-
596 lutionary social and political doctrines after 1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had brought the traditional family under attack as early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated with it as either non-existent or harmful to society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread currency in China until the rise of the New Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese thought and expression. It emphasized individualism, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of this sort were spread by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in the mid-twenties, by the student of anti-Japanese agitation of the thirties, and in the socially concious writings of China's new and popular authors.

D. Effects on Family Nature and Structure

596 178 In the relatively small area where these influences were felt, traditional family organization and the roles and functions dependent on it were forced to give way. With a part of the family temporarily or permanently in the city, the authority of the traditional family head was undermined. He was still needed at home to carry on the farm work, and so it was generally the daughters, the sons not needed for agriculture, and occasionally, the wives who entered the cities to seek part-time or full-time work. They sent home from the cities whatever part of their wages that could be spared from their own living needs. The family head thus controlled only their excess earnings and not their full income. He no longer directed the production of the family as a unit nor determined wholly every member's share in consumption. For at least part of the year, he could exert no direct control over the city-dwelling members of the family. With the possibility of an independent livelihood in the city, adult family members in nearby villages had an alternative to harsh treatment by the family head. This factor tended to have a moderating influence on paternalistic authoritarianism.

369 596 178 562 The family in the rural areas adjacent to industrialized cities was also affected in other ways. Men of advanced years, particularly if they had a classical education or held official position, continued to be honored. However, their position of influence and authority was challenged by younger men with the personal qualities of dynamic leadership and success. Ancestor worship

369 continued to give a greater primacy to males in
596 the family, but the ability of daughters to earn
178 a wage enhanced their value to the family and
562 made their early marriage into another family less desirable. It should be noted, however, that women of farming and laboring families worked outside of the home only out of sheer economic necessity. Neither sex approved of female employment in the factory. Whenever possible, it was avoided or terminated. Among upper-class families, women with modern education began gradually to seek employment in the professions and to regard such work as a means of establishing permanent personal and economic independence.

The independent family in the modern city was most subject to change. Though the influence of the past remained strong, the city families tended toward the nuclear, democratic form. Thus, the old criteria of status based on sex, age, and generation were undermined. This tendency was strongest among the new clerical, managerial, and professional groups in the city. They came mostly from the old well-to-do merchant and gentry class which could afford modern education, sometimes abroad, for their children. Having a higher education, the younger members of this group were far more influenced than were the less literate lower class youth by such modern Western ideas as the right to individual happiness, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of the citizen to give his first loyalty to the interests of the nation.

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178 While modern education gave youth increased stature in the eyes of the family elders, it also served to decrease youth's respect for parents. Olga Lang's 1936 survey of youthful attitudes toward parents disclosed that while only 20 per cent of the boys and 16 per cent of the girls in high school were willing to answer the question as to whether they ever disapproved of their parents' behavior, 58 per cent of the men and 62 per cent of the women in college were willing to answer, and their answers were overwhelmingly critical. The greatest objects of censure were the father, his political views, and his personal habits. He was criticized as "conservative," "feudal,: acting "against the trend of the time"; as "immoral," "corrupt," "lazy," "egotistic," "too cautious"; and for gambling, smoking opium and frequenting brotherls Mothers were more gently and less often criticized but they were reproached for "political backwardness," "unhygienic habits," "gossiping, playing mah-jong, quarrelling [and] ill treatment of young daughters-in-law." College students also reported more actual disagreements with parents than did high school students. The most frequent subjects of disagreement were marriage, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, recreation, modern hygiene, and fashions, friends, and future professions.[6]

E. Effect on Family Economic Role

The decreasing ability of the family to function as a production and consumption unit or as an employment agency in an industrial society

6. Lang, op. cit., pp. 284-87.

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178 has already been pointed out. The initial break with the old form of employment was forced by foreign firms or government services headed by foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices.

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successsively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911.

7. Ibid., pp. 186-89.

178 596 No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with failure among the nation's youth.[8]

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

596 671 582 In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater immediate success.[9]

Eassentially, the outward provisions of the Marriage Law are comparable to the laws affecting marriage and the family in the civil and penal code announced by the National Government in 1930 and 1931.[10] The basic features of the new law are summed up in its first three articles, which provide for:

> (1)...The abolition of arbitrary and compulsory marriage and the putting into effect of freedom of marriage for men and women.
>
> (2)...The abolition of the feudal system

8. Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, Aug.1955, pp.515-32.

[9. and 10. next page]

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563 too various to desc ribe in this chapter.[36] Under
596 the Communists, the tribal peoples have been given special treatment, and the uniqueness of [37] their social systems has been largely preserved. No attempt was made to implement the new Marriage Law in the ethnic minority autonomous areas established by the new regime.

• 178 In the twentieth century, family patterns among the Chinese people of the Southwest Region have largely followed the forms of traditional China before the beginning of industrialization and the resulting outgrowth of revolutionary social and political forces.[38] The customs and practices of the Chinese people long established on the Chengtu Plain and of immigrants, mostly from the Yangtze River provinces of the Central-South and East China regions, were little disturbed by modern trends until the capital of the Nationalist Government was moved to Chungking during the war with Japan. Previously, Western-style commerce and industry had made little progress in the region, the intrusion of modern trends from other parts of China had been barred by the lack of railway and highway links with the outside world, and warlord rule had perpetuated traditional values and
178 practic e s. One significant modern influence that
873 had made its way into the region was modern education at the universities, especially in the

36. The chapter on Ethnic Groups describes some of the major social characteristics of the principal indigenous tribes.

37. See Fei Hsiao-t'ung, "Minority Groups in Kweichow Province," C.B., 150, pp.8-15.

38. On the family in the Southwest Region, see Francis L.K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow: Chinese Culture and Personality, New York, Columbia U. Press, 1948; and Fei Hsiao-t'ung, China's [cont'd]

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178 provincial capital of Chengtu and its vicinity.
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178 Just before the war, transportation systems began to bring the Southwest Region into contact with the rest of China. The wartime needs of the Nationalist Government led to the beginning of modern industrial and commercial development within the region and the exploration and development of its mineral resources. Refugee students and professors from other parts of China were scattered in makeshift unversities throughout the Southwest Region. Many of the educated group made determined efforts to filter to the people some of the new political and social ideas derived from Chinese contact with the West through the mesh of the Kuomintang wartime censorship. Some refugee intellectuals were enlisted in the rural reconstruction program, headed by James Yen, who attempted in scattered rural areas to improve literacy, agricultural methods, and living habits and to spread new social and political ideas. Although stripped of their former revolutionary content, they contained within them the seeds of change in family and other areas of life.[39]

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178 The results of these innovations in the Southwest Region appear to have been minor and ephemeral, but it is still too early to assay their long-range and lasting effects. The influences of the intellectuals and of the personnel of the rural

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39. On the rural reconstruction program see Paul M. A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek [sic.] : A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, pp. 218-22.

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178 reconstruction program probably cut deepest because of the patriotic eagerness and sincerity with which many of the educated group sought communication with the peasants, understanding of their problems, and the elevation of their social and political life and outlook. Industrial influences seem to have been less penetrating. Manufacturing plants were generallysmall, decentralized operations most centered in the wartime capital. Refugees from the modern cities stayed close to Chungking and viewed the permanent residents with contempt. The factories, the immigrants who supervised them, and the modern habits of the recent arrivals from the western cities were in turn looked on with suspicion and dislike by the older inhabitants. As soon as the war was over, many of the war-born industries were discontinued and the urban immigrants moved back to the industrialized centers of the East with their ammeniti for modern living. However, some of the new factories remained open after the war, the mining possibilities of the region had begun to be explored and developed, and permanent changes with closer links to the rest of China were underway before the Communists entered the Southwest Region.[40]

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40. On the Southwest in wartime see Linebarger, op. cit., pp 218-34; and Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1946 pp. 3-19, 54-72, and passim.

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178 The Communist government, with its penchant for regimentation and passion for industrialization, is exerting a more intense and pervasive influence on the region. If and as the new regime fulfills its plans for industrialization and the organization of rural areas in co-operatives or collectives, more insistent pressures than mere propaganda will be brought to bear on the traditional family. But even this kind of force will not completely wipe out the old attitudes and loyalties of the elder generation. The youth of the region will probably prove less resistant and more in favor of the "new order," as has been true elsewhere in China. But as the young people are emancipated from the old family restriction, they are likely to manifest the tendencies, already evident in the youth of the eastern cities, toward individualism and romanticism in love and marriage which pose a problem of equal calibre for the new rulers of China.

735 authority so complete as to lead to a state of near anarchy."[2]

178 311 The characteristic way of life of the peasants has been slowly disintegrating under manifold pressures. During prosperous periods in the past a delicate balance of human and economic factors fostered a crowded, conformist, but on the whole harmonious village life. Recent decades have seen the old harmony replaced by tension and a predatory struggle for survival. And, despite the isolation of most villages, ideas and ideals from the West have slowly undermined the authority of the older mores and customary laws.

178 Despite all the fissures that have developed, it is well to remember that peasant life everywhere has a tremendous inertia, that it is incredibly resistant to all the forces of

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2. Maurice Zinkin, Asia and the West, London 1951, p. 111. H. L. Richardson, commenting in 1942 on Szechwan -- usually regarded as a fertile and prosperous province -- says: "The condition of the individual farmers is less happy than the prosperity of the Province as a whole would suggest, and the pressure of the whole population on the supplies of food and other agricultural products, such as cotton, is very intense." Cressey, op. cit., pp. 178-79.

178 change. Thus much of the sweeping change that occurred in city life under comparable pressures did not occur in the peasant villages.

221 527 The main economic and social unit of the village is the family, and a special study is devoted to that subject. Here we should sketch the rhythm of village life and something of its annual cycle of activity.

The New Year holiday, for the people of China the first fifteen days of the year, is the main period of leisure for the villagers. Food is prepared in advance, and even the women may rest from their cooking during the first days of the holiday. The village is decorated with nien-hua (New Year's pictures) and ch'un-lien (paired New Year's Day mottoes). Visiting friends, and relatives, gambling, eating the best food of the year, wearing the best clothes, and indulging the children make this the most festive period in the year. For many families it is the only time in the year when they can afford to eat meat dishes. The special dishes of the season vary from province to province. In the northern provinces chiao-tzu (meat dumplings) and other wheat-based elaborate dishes are particular favorites; as one moves south, rice-based delicacies such as nien-kao (year cakes) figure more prominently in the New Year's feasts. Besides being a time of celebration, the New Year is also the time for settling accounts; for many

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178 There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly during the last five years. Change has been brought about by two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes.

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668 These two factors are closely inter- related. Thus, the Communists have been making a sympathetic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point:

> Co-operative agriculture has
> organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly
> mistreated,
> but the new society teaches friend-
> ship and love.[29]

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29 Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, p.21. Three-character rhymed verses [cont'd next page]

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of others [the group] : this is -- or is not -- individualism."[43]

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[44] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

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In traditional China, time and change were

42. Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's forword to this volume, xxii.

43. Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual], cited in Nivison, op.cit., pp.45-46, and note 66.

44. Cf. Anon., "The 'Struggle Meeting' in Communist China," Far Eastern Notes, No. 1. April 21, 1952.

178 181 668

regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjustment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of Nature, Chinese-farmer-thinkers developed a notion of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was not seen a the end of the line but as a return to childhood -- not in the sense of "second childhood" but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When empire has long been unified it will invariably be divided." [45]

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbook Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight-line change

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45. San-kuo Chih Yen-i, [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

178 181 668 is typically and authoritatively expressed by Liu Shao-ch'i:

> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms..., their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved...."[46]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, not that of cause and effect. Night follows day, but day is not the cause of night.[47] Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can actively participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results.

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46. Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background, No. 159, Jan. 31, 1952, p. 18.

47. Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

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178 668 181 The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

C. Work and Leisure

461 668 In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[48] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristic of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared.

D. Authority and the Individual

597 The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally, the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction.

48. Ibid., pp. 37-40.

596 In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bride, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

572 The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[51]

181 The two patterns -- paternal domination and
572 fraternal association -- are reflected in political
596 life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

181 When the old social order began to break up
978 under the impact of modern forces, the family

51. Ibid., pp. 137-47.

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system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[52]

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories

52. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1k,
Sociological Background

RELIGION

I. INTRODUCTION

771 Religious organization and activity in China has always been strictly limited by what the state felt to be desirable. Public and private morality were not based on any religion but on a combination of philosophic principles (Confucianism) and secular mores. (On this principle, Confucianism is treated in the chapters on Social Values and Patterns of living.) Governmental authority judged whether a certain religion was conducive to morality and the welfare of the state and then allowed the religion and its adherents a carefully defined range and sphere of activity. Anything beyond that range was regarded as subversive of public welfare and morality, and the religion was curbed or suppressed. As a consequence China has not had, until very recently, any "churches," that is well-organized, centrally disciplined organizations of believers capable of decisively influencing public morality or state policy.

•[178] With the slow collapse of the traditional order the effectiveness of government control of religion diminished. The Western powers, 771 as they gained more and more rights and conces- 648 sions from a weakening China, demanded and

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nearby farms. In Hangchow, some 1,800 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22] We have few details on the fate of the Buddhist clergy in the Southwest.

There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the Buddha's birth day.[23] But the general impression is that Buddhism is dying. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed under the present regime. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer

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22. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

23. New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddha" on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

779 to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the
178 times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

III. TAOISM

779 Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism

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24. The outstanding example is Chü-tsan -- a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religious, and social work -- the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü-tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. also, Chü-tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

575 Farmers active in secret societies, which
565 are traditionally opposed to government control,
184 may have a different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) sect was reported active as late as the summer of 1955 and apparently has survived Communist efforts to stamp it out. Other secret societies are of minor importance in comparison with those operating in Central-South or East China

II. URBAN WORKERS

565 Southwest China had been backward in indus-
178 trial development until the late 1930's when
184 some industrial plants were moved from the coastal areas to places like Chungking and Wanhsien in Szechwan Province. Even as late as 1952 there were still very few industrial workers in this region. Most of them were not organized until after 1949 and were not involved in earlier political movements. Before unionization, industrial workers in Southwest China had no greater national feeling than was commong among the farmers.

565 The Communists' avowed attempt to raise
184 the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learned of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the New China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most

178 Another problem was the number of steel plants and textile mills which had been established in the Southwest during war against 499 653 Japan. The years of civil war in 1949 and 1950 had produced a depression, and industry and commerce could no longer maintain themselves. As a remedy the Communists proposed the construction of the Chungking-Chengtu Railroad. In spite of the great financial difficulties in which the Communist central government was involved at that time, it was decided to invest an amount of money equivalent to 76,000,000 catties of rice for highway construction and 180,000,000 catties for railroad construction. These projects stimulated the revival of the steel, coal, and electrical engineering industries and the economic condition of Szechwan gradually improved.

563 A further problem special to this region was 162 that of the national minorities which amounted, according to the latest census and the report of Wang Wei-chou, to about 12 million

Tibetans	2,775,627
Yi People	3,254,269
Miao People	2,511,339
Chung-chia	1,600,000
Mohammedans	1,000,000
Min-chia	600,000
Thai People	400,000
Total	12,341,235

636 In order to meet the demands of these minorities 563 autonomous areas were established. The Tibetans in Sikang constitute a special area, even though

635 August 1-8, 1955 and was attended by 650 members consisting of Chinese, Tibetans, Chuangs, Yi's and Miaos. Li Ching-ch'üan, Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government, made a report on the work of the past two years and the important tasks to be done in the coming winter and spring. He referred to improvements in agriculture and industry, giving the following figures for 1952 as 100:

Industries	1953	199.11
	1954	307.9 estimated
Agriculture	1953	86 %
	1954	6 %

There were 34 national and local factories and mines in the region, 604 agricultural co-operatives and 990,000 mutual-aid teams. In the same report he claimed that the people of Szechwan supported the building of the railroads from Chungking to Chengtu and from Chengtu to Pao-chi, and also the surveying of oil fields in Szechwan.

635 With regard to the tasks of the coming winter and spring, he asked the people of Szechwan to try to reach the goal for the second year of the five-year plan. Li's report was passed. Another report on the Constitutional draft was made by Governor Li. After a serious debate, it was given a unanimous support. Finally, 87 delegates to the National Congress were elected with Chu Teh at the head of the list.[8]

8. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, August 10, 1952.

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II. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

433 Despite the program of expansion during World War II, industrial development in Southwest China is minor compared to that in the maritime provinces (See Table 9).[1]

433 178 Before 1940, there were few modern factories in the Southwest. After the removal of the Nationalist Government to Chungking, an attempt was made to expand industrial production in the Southwest provinces to meet China's wartime needs and lessen the threat of inflation to the economy of Free China. Although the result fell short of the intended objective, a comparatively substantial increase in industrial production occurred in the provinces of the Southwest Region. The government itself owned many industries and offered subsidies to private enterprises. Continued price increases as a result of inflation and the lack of outside competition as a result of wartime blockade encouraged further expansion. After the war ended, many so-called "extra-marginal" firms went bankrupt. Some government enterprises were abandoned in order that personnel could be transferred to more efficient plants as they became available in other sections of the country, particularly in Manchuria and Formosa. Because of these changes, it is possible that industrial production in Southwest China decreased during the postwar years.

[1] [Table 9 is missing -- Analyst]

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 3f,
Economic Background

SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE */

178 Prior to World War II, few modern industries had been developed in Southwest China. There were no spinning mills or cotton textile plants, for example. Power plants in the region produced only 17,000 kilowatts of electricity, an amount so low that it discouraged further industrial development. Only after the retreat of the Nationalist Government to Szechwan and the subsequent arrival of industrial equipment salvaged from East and Central China was it possible for a modern industrial society to develop. Factories were rapidly constructed, and some 10,000 skilled laborers migrated to Southwest China. Most of these factories were poorly built, had insufficient equipment, were inadequately financed, and encountered difficulty in maintaining operations under the impact of inflation during the war years. After the war, those industries which had survived were forced out of business by the press of competition from east coast cities and foreign markets.

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*/ Unless otherwise indicated, information in this chapter is supplied by Dr. K. N. Chang, consultant and author of chapter, from private sources.

769 Ancestor worship is institutionalized to an amazing extent. Not only the very large and wealthy families and clans but also the ordinary well-to-do ones have a separate ancestral temple. All go to great lengths and expenses to ensure good sites for family graveyards according to geomancy. In order to make sure that the fortune of the family will be on the up all the time it is the custom to change graveyards to new sites when the old ones have become suspect. Old imperial honors granted from Peking have been and are still highly valued. Walking through the town and its villages one comes upon numerous plaques of honor on the portals to many family homes.

249 Not many years ago, before the advent of the power of the Central Government into the province, opium growing was general. George B. Crossey prints in his book, China's Geographical Foundations (1934) a photograph showing "Fields of Opium Poppy Outside the Walls of Yunnan-fu" (Kunming). This sight is no longer common today, especially in the more communicable parts. In the remoter interior of the province, the author has been told, opium is still being grown. Opium smoking is certainly very widespread everywhere in the province. Opium-growing in this town and its satellite villages was formerly the source of income for many families, and the trading of the commodity has enabled many families to become wealthy, indeed. The prohibition of its plantation has caused many small farmers to sigh about the passed "golden age," but has not prevented the wealthy families from making even more profit out of the now scarcer supply. These facts have at least been partly responsible for the wealth of West Town.

556 West Town contains a disporportionately large number of wealthy families. These families are not mere local stars. They are rather outstanding even in the larger provincial cities and in Kunming. One year ago the top of these families performed a funeral that lasted over two months and cost about one million national dollars. Even the lesser ones are also considerable. Soon after the fabulous funeral the wedding of the young master of a small one-room cloth store in the town cost ten thousand national dollars while the wages of laborers in the town were still about two or three dollars a day with board.

556 178 743 871 This wealth has perhaps given rise to the over-emphasis on the ancient ways as regards imperial honors, ancestor worship and sexual differences. But in recent years a few wealthy families have also supported in the town three schools, a hospital and a public library. The hospital has about twenty beds, one graduate nurse, two medical officers (both M.D.'s, one was trained in Peiping Union Medical College), a number of assistant nurses and a nursing training class. It has arrangement for free medicine and hospitalization for the poor. The schools are: one middle school, one primary school divided into two parts, and one normal school. The three schools combined have a total enrollment of about 1,400. The first and second schools are co-educational. The principal of the middle school is a local man who has studied in Ts'ing Hua University, Peiping.

Influences from Outside

491 492 205 Before the days of the Burma Road, motor transportation was scarcely known to this region and communication with Kunming took about two or three weeks one way. After the opening of the Burma Road the town was soon connected with the Road by a sort of badly constructed highway. But the principal mode of travelling is still pack horses and "chairs" (Hua Kan). Since about two years ago there has been a third-class post office receiving mail from Kunming once in two days.

178 As a result of the recent barbaric Japanese invasion of
722 China and the great influx of modern people and ideas from down-river into the Basin during the past few years, a renaissance has begun in Szechuan Basin. The Basin is now undergoing an economic awakening. It is in a state of rapid transition, induced and intensified by the exigencies of the war.

185 Since the migration of the National government into the
654 Basin, every possible means has been utilized and every feasible
241 plan is being drawn up to increase the efficiency of land use in the Basin. Mention may be made of a few striking examples.

In agricultural land use, various measures have been devised to cope with the inefficient traditional Tung Shui Tien field system; the acreage in Tsai Seng Tao variety rice has been extended; cotton culture has been expanded; the cultivated acreage of herb plants has been increased; more modern sugar refineries have been built, experimental stations have been established, and a number of new varieties of sugar cane have been introduced; silk-culture has been organized and operated on a more scientific basis; a number of tea-growers' cooperatives have been found recently; and above all, the practices in fertilization, terracing, erosion control, and irrigation works have been improved.

178 With the introduction of more modern methods of processing, the numerous agricultural and forestry products of the Basin are being put into more efficient utilization. The increasing manufacture of alcohol and wines from grains, the making of charcoal from wood, and the preparation of synthetic gasoline from tung oil are notable examples. These innovations not only meet the various emergent war needs, especially that of fuel supply, but also help to solve the still difficult transportation problem by transforming the bulky agricultural and forestry products into lighter and more transportable forms.

313 In forestry land use, significant improvements have already taken place. A number of large corporations, financed either by government or private interests, have recently organized to survey intensively and to exploit systematically the rich forestry
314 resources of the Basin. Numerous attempts have been made to improve tung tree production, including the establishment of more tung tree plantations and experimental stations, the supply of modern equipment, and the efficient organization of marketing facilities. Besides, the recent completion of the west branch of

7: Hu K-5 (1934-) 1946 AF16 Southwest China AF16

the Szechuan-Yunnan highway will relieve to a considerable degree the traditional difficulty of transporting the wax insects for the white-wax tree industry. 314

In both mining and manufacturing, rapid progress has also been made. During the past few years, the Basin's coal production has been increased 400 per cent, iron production 300 per cent, and placer mining 200 per cent. Besides, the Basin is rapidly developing into a new industrial center of free China. It is now the home of over 61 per cent of free China's machine industry. At present the Basin accounts for about 40 per cent of the total manufacturing capacity of all free China. 316 178

Even in the most chronic and difficult problem of transportation land use, rapid progress is being made. Numerous commercial air lines have been inaugurated since 1932, many railways (some of them already under construction) have been projected; and the highway network of the Basin has been partly completed. Of the Basin's 136 districts, 85 districts, or 62 per cent, now have highway connections. Most important of all, the various projects for canalization of the numerous streams in the Basin have been vigorously advanced. Many of these projects (such as the Chi and Upper Chialing rivers) have already been completed. These achievements and many more to follow will make a long stride toward the satisfactory solution of the Basin's acute transportation problem. 489

As to the future development of the Basin, one may approach the problem from two standpoints: first, the future prospect of the Basin as a base of operation against the Japanese invasion; and second, the future position of the Basin when peace returns once more. 133

As regards the first objective, the future of the Basin is bright. First of all, here, in Szechuan Basin, one finds a unique geographic region which has the interesting and fortunate combination of a mild south-China climate (with a long growing season), a rich north-China mineral resource (particularly coal and iron), a Yangtse Delta agricultural wealth, and above all, a southwest-China rugged mountain topography which provides protection against military invasion. The agricultural richness of the Basin is particularly important in maintaining a sustained self-sufficiency and should enable the region to hold longer against invading forces than would otherwise be possible. 241